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I. INTRODUCTION  
Last year’s Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market 
Conditions with Respect to Mobile Wireless (“14th Wireless Report”), 
issued by the FCC, broke new ground compared to prior reports.1 The FCC 
should be commended for its willingness to expand the scope of its 
competition report, for example, by including related markets such as 
handsets and applications as part of its analysis.2 The report also broke new 
ground by not concluding, as it had in prior reports, that the wireless 
services market was effectively competitive.3 This year’s report (“15th 
Wireless Report”) followed suit and refrained from making any 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to 
Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile Services, Fourteenth Report, 25 F.C.C.R. 
11407 (May 20, 2010) [hereinafter 14th Wireless Report]. In addition to withdrawing its 
finding of effective competition, the FCC also changed the title of the report from “13th 
Annual CMRS Report” to “14th Mobile Wireless Competition Report.” See Commercial 
Mobile Radio Services (CMRS) Competition Reports, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/reports? 
filter_terms[0]=0&filter_terms[1]=96&topics[0]=0&op=Apply%20Filter http://wireless.fcc. 
gov/ index.htm?job=cmrs_reports (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).  
 2.  14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at paras. 239–41. 
 3. 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at para. 16. This term is generally used as a 
surrogate for “good performance.”   
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competitive assessment.4 This retreat from the FCC’s earlier competitive 
assessments suggests a change in the FCC’s outlook on this market. In 
addition, the omission of a statement on competition in this market appears 
to directly contravene Congress’s mandate to the FCC to produce annually 
a Competition Report that “shall include in its annual report an analysis of . 
. . whether or not there is effective competition.”5   
A key issue in reaching a conclusion about effective competition is 
how to interpret the evidence. The 14th and 15th Wireless Reports review a 
wide variety of evidence, both direct (how firms and customers behave) 
and indirect (industry concentration measures).6 The reports are silent, 
however, on how to interpret this evidence. In contrast, modern antitrust 
analysis tends to rely far more on direct evidence and less on indirect 
evidence. Ironically, at least one highly influential reader7 of the reports 
focuses entirely on the indirect (less relevant) evidence to draw a strongly 
negative assessment, which we think is unwarranted. We are concerned 
that this apparent refusal of the FCC to follow modern competitive analysis 
standards bodes ill for future regulatory decision making (in this as well as 
other markets).  
In failing to put more weight on the relevant direct market evidence to 
reach a more informed competitive assessment, the 14th and 15th Wireless 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to 
Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile Services, Fifteenth Report, 26 F.C.C.R. 
9664 (June 27, 2011) [hereinafter 15th Wireless Report]. 
 5. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(C) (2010). 
6.  See 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at para. 48. See also 15th Wireless Report, 
supra note 4, at para. 40. 
 7. In his statement relating to the 14th Wireless Report, Commissioner Copps was 
quite clear in his reliance on indirect evidence, noting that,  
One number sticks out like a sore thumb: the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index—a 
widely-recognized and highly-credible measurement of industry 
concentration—shows that the concentration of mobile wireless service 
providers has skyrocketed to a weighted average of 2848. That’s a jump of 
nearly 700 since we first calculated this metric a mere 7 years ago! So without 
denying those things that are right in the wireless world—and they are many—
the facts also tell us that some things are not right.  
14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at 11703. Commissioner Copps again focused on the 
concentration data in the 15th Wireless Report: 
Finally, I cannot ignore some of the darkening clouds over the state of mobile 
competition. The headline for this Report will be that the FCC neither finds nor 
does not find effective competition. Dig deeper and, sure enough, we find 
ongoing trends of industry consolidation. The well-accepted metric for market 
concentration, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, remains above the threshold 
for a ‘highly concentrated’ market. 
15th Wireless Report, supra note 4, at 9968. See discussion infra Parts II, V (discussing 
overreliance on indirect measures of market power). 
322 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64 
Reports invite erroneous conclusions about the real state of competition in 
wireless markets. Stated differently, the FCC’s purpose should be to 
directly assess performance. To be fair, in the introduction to its 15th 
Wireless Report, the FCC acknowledges that “market performance metrics 
provide more direct evidence of competitive outcomes and the strength of 
competitive rivalry than market structure factors, such as concentration 
measures.”8 Yet the 15th Wireless Report begins with an analysis of market 
structure—suggesting that market structure provides an important 
barometer of wireless competition—and its Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(“HHI”) calculations are highlighted in the Executive Summary (which 
precedes the Introduction) without the appropriate disclaimer that 
concentration may not indicate market power.9 We are concerned that the 
FCC’s undue emphasis on indirect evidence could eventually adversely 
influence regulatory policy in wireless markets.10 
Economists generally believe that competitive analysis should be 
about satisfying customers. If firms exercise market power, customers may 
suffer through higher prices, reduced quality, and foreclosed entry of new 
competitors. If firms are not exercising market power, the market will have 
strong competition, customers will get what they want, and regulators do 
not need to intervene in the market. Traditionally, competitive analysis was 
not based on measuring what is happening to customers. Because 
economists did not have the tools to adequately measure this effect, they 
relied on indirect measures, such as market share in the relevant markets, 
the HHI, and market definitions.11  
The approach to market analysis changed substantially with the 
landmark Staples-Office Depot proposed merger. The Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) employed a new standard of direct evidence, 
examining whether the merger would actually raise prices to customers 
instead of using indirect measures. It found compelling direct evidence that 
in markets without the presence of both firms, prices were significantly 
higher.12 Accordingly, the agency denied the merger. Since then, this direct 
                                                                                                                 
 8. 15th Wireless Report, supra note 4, at para. 10. 
 9. Id. at 16.  
 10. The FCC has excellent staff economists who are well equipped to perform a state-
of-the-art competitive analysis. We are dismayed that the FCC failed to use the considerable 
staff talents at their disposal to draw the obvious conclusion, based on the direct evidence, 
that this market exhibits “effective competition.” 
 11. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, 10 ANTITRUST 23 
(Spring 2010).  
 12. See Press Release, Federal Trade Comm’n, Federal Trade Commission Rejects 
Proposed Settlement in Staples/Office Depot Merger (Apr. 4, 1997) (on file with the Federal 
Trade Commission) (“The FTC’s decision to ask a court to block the merger is about lower 
prices for consumers. If the merger is allowed to proceed, consumers will pay millions of 
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approach has become the modern standard for conducting competitive 
analysis.  
To determine whether firms are exercising monopoly power, one 
looks directly at the conduct of the firm: Does the firm in question behave 
like a monopolist? This direct approach has been widely embraced by 
academic economists,13 and in 2010, the federal antitrust agencies revised 
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines to reflect this new thinking in 
competition analysis.14 A review of the 14th and 15th Wireless Reports 
reveals that the FCC considered in great detail (but did not rely upon) this 
direct evidence of market power.15 For example, in Table 19 of the 14th 
Wireless Report, the FCC chronicles the downward trajectory of average 
revenue per voice minute from 1993 through 2008 ($0.44 to $0.05) and the 
upward trajectory of minutes of use per month over the same period (140 to 
708),16 but fails to attribute these massive consumer welfare gains to 
enhanced competition.17   
                                                                                                                 
dollars more for their copy paper, envelopes, pens and file folders.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Aaron S. Edlin & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Exclusion or Efficient Pricing? 
The “Big Deal” Bundling of Academic Journals, 72 ANTITRUST L. J. 119, 141 (2004) 
(“Market definition is only a traditional means to the end of determining whether power 
over price exists. Power over price is what matters. As is stated in the Areeda, Elhauge, and 
Hovenkamp treatise, cases such as Microsoft, and the Areeda, Kaplow, and Edlin casebook, 
if power can be shown directly, there is no need for market definition: the value of market 
definition is in cases where power cannot be shown directly and must be inferred from 
sufficiently high market share in a relevant market.”).  
 14. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. AND THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES (Aug. 2010) [hereinafter 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES]; see also discussion infra 
Part II. 
 15. Despite the obvious difference in competition analysis between the FCC and the 
antitrust agencies, the FCC remarkably claims that “DOJ’s position on competition policy is 
in agreement with the approach taken in the Fourteenth Report.” 14th Wireless Report, 
supra note 1, at para. 16. In fact, the DOJ embraces a decidedly different perspective on 
competition analysis generally and on wireless competition in particular. See, Economic 
Issues in Broadband Competition, Ex Parte Submission of the United States Department of 
Justice, GN Docket No. 09-51, Sec. C.2 (“The history of competition in the mobile wireless 
market suggests that the entry of additional providers has resulted in consumers paying less, 
receiving new features and better handsets, and enjoying higher quality service. . . . “As a 
result, consumers seem to be paying less on a per-minute basis for voice services and are 
using their mobile wireless devices more. The average wireless revenue per minute has 
declined from about 37 cents in 1997 to 6 cents in 2007, and average monthly minutes of 
use have increased from about 100 to almost 800 over the same period.”). 
 16. 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at 11531 tbl.19. The report also notes the 
decline in prices for wireless handsets generally and smartphones in particular. Id. at 11592 
chart 45.   
 17. The report focuses instead on carrier profitability as a measure of market power. 
See id. at paras. 215–16. High profits could also come from superior performance, an 
alternative hypothesis not considered by the FCC. Indeed, the FCC cites high churn rates 
among wireless carriers, which corroborates the alternative, competition hypothesis. See id. 
para. 245 (“Most providers report churn rates for postpaid subscribers of between 1.5 
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The Reports critically ignored the continuing downward trajectory in 
wireless prices. Despite its June 2011 release, the 15th Wireless Report 
tracks the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (“BLS”) Cellular Consumer Price 
Index (“CPI”) and industry average revenues per user (“ARPUs”) only 
through 2009.18 According to the BLS, wireless prices decreased by 3 
percent from January 2008 to December 2010. By comparison, the CPI for 
all goods and services increased by nearly 4 percent over the same 
period.19 Thus, by failing to extend its time series through December 2010, 
the 15th Wireless Report missed an important price decline (of nearly 3 
percent) from December 2009 through December 2010 and focused instead 
on the nearly constant prices from December 2008 through December 
2009. Indeed, the same series shows wireless prices falling by another 3 
percent from December 2010 through May 2011. Falling prices and market 
power usually do not coexist; this secular price decline is far more likely to 
signal effective competition, not market power. 
The 14th and 15th Wireless Reports ignored this and similar direct 
evidence of competition—namely, aggressive pricing behavior, robust 
entry, and continued long-term reduction in prices, all of which strongly 
support a conclusion of “effective competition.”20 Instead, the FCC focuses 
on inferences of market power based on market shares. For example, in the 
14th Wireless Report, the FCC makes much of the combined share of the 
top four wireless providers21 generally, and of the top two wireless 
                                                                                                                 
percent and 3.3 percent per month (see Chart 38).”). 
 18. See 15th Wireless Report, supra note 4, at para 2. 
 19. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CPI DETAILED REPORT: DATA FOR JANUARY 
2008 34–40 tbl.3 (Malik Crawford ed., 2008), http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid0801.pdf. See 
also BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CPI DETAILED REPORT: DATA FOR DECEMBER 2010 11–
17 tbl.3 (Malik Crawford et al. eds., 2010), http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid0801.pdf. According 
to the BLS, wireless prices decreased by 3 percent from January 2008 to December 2010 
(from 64.089 in 2008 to 61.339 in 2010). By comparison, the CPI for all items increased by 
nearly 8 percent (from 211.512 in 2008 to 219.179 in 2010).  
 20. See 15th Wireless Report, supra note 4, at para. 2.  
 21. See 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at para. 30 (emphasis added) (“From these 
data, we see that the four nationwide service providers account for 90 percent of the nation’s 
mobile wireless subscribers (including Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) 
subscribers), with AT&T and Verizon Wireless accounting for 60 percent).”). Given that 
MVNOs offer different service plans (for example, pre-paid), they arguably should be 
considered distinct providers. However, the FCC’s treatment of MVNO subscribers in its 
market share calculations suggests that MVNO customers are really not customers of the 
MVNO, but instead are customers of the underlying facilities-based provider. In seeking to 
diminish the role of MVNOs, the FCC later argues that “because MVNOs purchase their 
mobile wireless services in wholesale contracts from facilities-based providers, the ability of 
MVNOs to compete against their host facilities-based provider is limited.” Id. at para. 32. 
Sears buys its appliances from General Electric and others, which Sears markets under the 
Kenmore name. To the extent that General Electric is competing with Kenmore/Sears, 
MVNOs are competing with facilities-based wireless carriers. 
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providers, AT&T and Verizon, in particular.22 Tellingly, the FCC admits 
that “[s]hares of subscribers and measures of concentration are not 
synonymous with market power—the ability to charge prices above the 
competitive level for a sustained period of time.”23 The 15th Wireless 
Report repeats this warning nearly verbatim.24 Despite the direct evidence 
of the lack of pricing power that the report presented, the FCC was 
unwilling to conclude, as it had in the prior six reports on this subject to 
Congress, that the U.S. wireless market was “effectively competitive.” 
Although the FCC correlated HHI in a local geographic area with 
population densities in both reports,25 it failed to correlate HHI with 
wireless prices in either report. Had it done so, it would have discovered 
that as the nationwide average HHI increased from 2,151 in December 
2003 to 2,848 in June 2010 (depicted on the first Y axis), and wireless 
prices as measured by the Cellular CPI were falling (depicted on the second 













                                                                                                                 
 22. Although the 14th Wireless Report often touts AT&T and Verizon’s combined 
share as being “60 percent” of wireless subscribers, their combined shares are actually lower 
based on the FCC’s own data. According to Chart 1 of the Report, the combined share of 
subscribers for AT&T and Verizon was 54.8 percent. Id. at 11441 chart 1. See also id. at 
11621 tbl.41 (noting that Merrill Lynch estimates the combined share of AT&T and Verizon 
to be 55.2 percent). At best, the FCC’s 60 percent market share figure was arrived through 
rounding error. 
 23. Id. at para. 55 (emphasis added). 
 24. 15th Wireless Report, supra note 4, at para. 54 (“Shares of subscribers and 
measures of concentration are not synonymous with a non-competitive market or with 
market power – the ability to charge prices above the competitive level for a sustained 
period of time.”). 
 25. See id. at para. 53. 
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Figure 1: Industry Concentration Is Rising While Cellular Prices Are 
Falling26 
 
In this report, we suggest how the FCC can improve its competitive 
analysis for future mobile wireless competition reports to be more 
consistent with modern economic analysis. Part II explains how direct 
evidence of market power has supplanted inferences based on market 
shares of some relevant market. In Part III, we assess the direct evidence of 
pricing power (or lack thereof) in the wireless services industry. We 
examine the direct evidence of exclusion (or lack thereof), the other 
hallmark of non-competitive markets, in Part IV. Entry by Clearwire, Leap, 
MetroPCS, the cable television providers, and LightSquared is inconsistent 
with any claim of monopolization. In Part V, we explain that a market 
structure analysis presumes a relationship between prices and the number 
of providers, when such a relationship does not always exist. Part VI 
investigates whether Verizon or AT&T possesses a “must-have” input that, 
if withheld from rivals, would impair their ability to compete effectively. In 
Part VII, we ask whether we are missing something critical to the 
competition analysis. Part VIII reviews the policy implications of our 
findings with respect to handset exclusivity and spectrum allocation. 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Id. at 9710 tbl.9, 9782 tbl.19. Notes: Population-weighted average HHI of 172 
Economic Areas as computed by the FCC. Cellular CPI is denominated in 2003 Prices.   
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II. DIRECT MEASURES OF MARKET POWER ARE PREFERABLE TO 
INFERENCES BASED ON MARKET SHARES 
As a general matter, direct evidence of monopoly power or 
anticompetitive effects is superior to indirect evidence of monopoly power 
derived from a traditional market definition inquiry (in which one defines a 
market to estimate market shares). The reason is that direct evidence, by 
definition, is based on actual market experience, whereas indirect evidence 
is not. 
Indeed, due to the conceptual and practical issues associated with 
demonstrating market power indirectly, many antitrust scholars and 
economists have embraced the use of direct evidence of market power as 
opposed to strict adherence to industry concentration.27 This is not to say 
that indirect assessments of competition have no value; rather, the best 
approach may be to use indirect (but easily computed) evidence as a screen, 
which can be used to identify situations requiring deeper and more accurate 
analyses using direct evidence.  
In fact, the federal antitrust agencies updated the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines in 2010 to focus more on direct evidence when assessing 
horizontal competition issues—that is, issues that involve conduct among 
rivals in the same industry. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines relegate the 
use of market shares and industry concentration to a component of 
competition analysis.28 Instead, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines stress 
direct evidence of likely competitive effects, including (1) actual effects in 
consummated mergers (for example, analyses or documents indicating an 
imminent price increase by the parties post-merger);29 (2) making use of an 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 
ANTITRUST L. J. 129, 131 (2007) (“But market definition may not be required when market 
power or anticompetitive effect can be demonstrated directly through means other than 
inference from the number, size distribution, and other characteristics of firms.”). 
 28. See 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 2.1.3 (“Mergers that cause a 
significant increase in concentration and result in highly concentrated markets are presumed 
to be likely to enhance market power, but this presumption can be rebutted by persuasive 
evidence showing that the merger is unlikely to enhance market power.”).  
 29. See id. § 2.1.1 (“When evaluating a consummated merger, the ultimate issue is not 
only whether adverse competitive effects have already resulted from the merger, but also 
whether such effects are likely to arise in the future. Evidence of observed post-merger price 
increases or other changes adverse to customers is given substantial weight. The Agencies 
evaluate whether such changes are anticompetitive effects resulting from the merger, in 
which case they can be dispositive. However, a consummated merger may be 
anticompetitive even if such effects have not yet been observed, perhaps because the merged 
firm may be aware of the possibility of post-merger antitrust review and moderating its 
conduct. Consequently, the Agencies also consider the same types of evidence they consider 
when evaluating unconsummated mergers.”). 
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existing natural experiment;30 (3) evidence of head-to-head competition 
between the parties;31 and (4) the disruptive role of a maverick firm.32  
Excessive focus on industry concentration as a means to assess 
market power is an antiquated concept that presumes (sometimes 
incorrectly) a direct relationship between industry structure and prices—
that is, higher concentration is predicted to lead to higher prices. The 
widely held notion that greater concentration leads to greater market power 
was supported by early empirical research, which at the time indicated that 
industries with higher levels of concentration appeared to exhibit higher 
accounting profits than less concentrated industries.33 Even this earlier 
research resulted in a weak statistical correlation, and it could not be used 
to conclude that any specific industry abided by the structure-conduct 
hypothesis. In any event, later research has called these findings into 
question on both empirical and theoretical grounds.34 As noted by 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See id. § 2.1.2 (“The Agencies look for historical events, or ‘natural experiments,’ 
that are informative regarding the competitive effects of the merger. For example, the 
Agencies may examine the impact of recent mergers, entry, expansion, or exit in the 
relevant market. Effects of analogous events in similar markets may also be informative. 
The Agencies also look for reliable evidence based on variations among similar markets. 
For example, if the merging firms compete in some locales but not others, comparisons of 
prices charged in regions where they do and do not compete may be informative regarding 
post-merger prices. In some cases, however, prices are set on such a broad geographic basis 
that such comparisons are not informative. The Agencies also may examine how prices in 
similar markets vary with the number of significant competitors in those markets.”). 
 31. See id. § 2.1.4 (“The Agencies consider whether the merging firms have been, or 
likely will become absent the merger, substantial head-to-head competitors. Such evidence 
can be especially relevant for evaluating adverse unilateral effects, which result directly 
from the loss of that competition.”). 
 32. See id. § 2.1.5 (“The Agencies consider whether a merger may lessen competition 
by eliminating a ‘maverick’ firm, i.e., a firm that plays a disruptive role in the market to the 
benefit of customers. For example, if one of the merging firms has a strong incumbency 
position and the other merging firm threatens to disrupt market conditions with a new 
technology or business model, their merger can involve the loss of actual or potential 
competition. Likewise, one of the merging firms may have the incentive to take the lead in 
price cutting or other competitive conduct or to resist increases in industry prices. A firm 
that may discipline prices based on its ability and incentive to expand production rapidly 
using available capacity also can be a maverick, as can a firm that has often resisted 
otherwise prevailing industry norms to cooperate on price setting or other terms of 
competition.”). 
 33. Joe S. Bain, Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration: American 
Manufacturing, 1936-1940, 65 Q. J. ECON. 293 (1951); Harold Demsetz, Two Systems of 
Belief About Monopoly, in EFFICIENCY, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 96 (1989) (“By 1960, 
then, collected evidence indicated a weak but generally positive correlation between 
concentration and profit rates.”).  
 34. See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, Improving the Economic Foundations of Competition 
Policy, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 10 (2003) (“The SCP paradigm was overturned because 
its empirical support evaporated.”); Timothy J. Muris, Economics and Antitrust, 5 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 303, 306 (1997) [hereinafter Economics and Antitrust] (“Although a 
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Professor Robert Willig, former deputy assistant attorney general of the 
DOJ’s Antitrust Division, “[a]ny reliance on such [concentration] metrics 
in the wireless industry, given its dynamic nature and complexity, likely 
will lead to misguided, and perhaps counterproductive, regulatory 
decisions.”35 Market concentration is no longer the primary focus of 
competition analysis but just one of many factors that assess the extent of 
market power.   
A far more appropriate way to assess pricing power is to look at direct 
evidence such as the trajectory of prices, price-cost relationships, and 
demand responses to price increases (“price effects”). Many courts have 
applied this direct evidence standard to decisions in antitrust ligation and 
acknowledged the validity of this approach.36 The types of informative 
direct evidence turn on the definition of market power. Economists 
typically agree that market power should be defined as (1) the ability to set 
prices above competitive levels37 and (2) the ability to exclude rivals.38   
                                                                                                                 
majority of antitrust economists and legal scholars prior to [the early 1970s] almost certainly 
believed that concentration was a major problem, that consensus collapsed.”). Increased 
concentration will be observed if some firms are simply more efficient than others, meaning 
that profits cause concentration, not vice-versa. See Demsetz, supra note 33, at 103–04; F. 
M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 280 (2d ed. 
1980) (“Up to this point it has been assumed that the higher average profitability observed 
for concentrated industries comes from the power to elevate prices that monopoly confers. 
There is, however, an alternative hypothesis: that the relationships reflect the superior 
efficiency of large oligopolistic sellers.”).  
 35. Comments of AT&T Inc., Declaration of Robert D. Willig at 10–11, 
Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, WT 
Docket No. 09–66 (Sept. 30, 2009). 
 36.  See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(“The existence of monopoly power may be proven through direct evidence of 
supracompetitive prices and restricted output.”); PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 
101, 107 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding that “there is authority to support [the 
proposition] that a relevant market definition is not a necessary component of a 
monopolization claim.”); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(stating that if “evidence indicates that a firm has in fact [profitably raised prices 
substantially above the competitive level] the existence of monopoly power is clear.”); Toys 
“R” Us v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2000) (using defendant’s ability to restrict 
output and, thereby, raise prices as proof of market power); Re/Max Int’l, Inc. v. Realty 
One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[A]lthough the Plaintiffs failed to define the 
relevant market with precision and therefore failed to establish the defendants' monopoly 
power through circumstantial evidence, there does exist a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether the Plaintiffs’ evidence shows direct evidence of a monopoly, that is, actual 
control over prices or actual exclusion of competitors.”); Rebel Oil Co., v. Atlantic 
Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995) (“If the plaintiff puts forth evidence of 
restricted output and supracompetitive prices, that is direct proof of the injury to competition 
which a competitor with market power may inflict, and thus, of the actual exercise of market 
power.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Edlin & Rubinfeld, supra note 13, at 141 (“Market definition is only a 
traditional means to the end of determining whether power over price exists. Power over 
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In sum, the 14th and 15th Wireless Reports focus excessive attention 
on outdated measures of competition and do not appear to put much weight 
on direct evidence, even though each report itself presents a great deal of 
such evidence. In forthcoming analyses, the FCC would be better served by 
focusing more on the direct evidence and less on indirect (and far less 
informative) criteria such as market shares and industry concentration. 
Doing so would present a much clearer picture of competition in the 
wireless marketplace. In Parts III and IV, we examine the record of direct 
evidence of competitive conduct in the wireless service industry.  
III. DIRECT EVIDENCE OF WIRELESS PRICING DOES NOT 
SUGGEST MARKET POWER 
The FCC’s own evidence shows that wireless providers have been 
cutting wireless prices to fend off rivals or what the report calls “price 
rivalry.”39 This is the opposite of the way monopolists behave. Indeed, the 
14th Wireless Report outlines at least eight effective price cuts by wireless 
carriers: 
1. AT&T introduced its “A-List” calling feature, which allows 
unlimited mobile calling to and from any five “VIP” domestic phone 
numbers at no additional charge.40  
2. Sprint introduced unlimited mobile-to-mobile calling at no 
additional charge.41  
3. T-Mobile introduced a lower-priced version of its unlimited 
national voice calling plan, and it reset prices on tiered offerings at 
significant discounts to its legacy plans.42  
4 and 5. Verizon Wireless reduced the prices of its unlimited voice 
plans for both individual and shared family offerings, prompting 
AT&T to do the same.43 
6, 7, and 8. “Sprint Nextel reduced the monthly charge on its Boost 
Unlimited voice and data plan to roughly half the price of the cheapest 
                                                                                                                 
price is what matters. As is stated in the Areeda, Elhauge, and Hovenkamp treatise, cases 
such as Microsoft, and the Areeda, Kaplow, and Edlin casebook, if power can be shown 
directly, there is no need for market definition: the value of market definition is in cases 
where power cannot be shown directly and must be inferred from sufficiently high market 
share in a relevant market.”). 
 38. See, e.g., LUÍS M. B. CABRAL, INTRODUCTION TO INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 6–11 
(2000). 
39. 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at para. 87.  
 40. Id. at para. 90. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at para. 91. 
 43. Id. at para. 92. 
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postpaid version of an unlimited voice and data offering then 
available,”44 which caused MetroPCS to enhance their respective 
unlimited local calling plans by reducing the monthly charges for add-
on features.45 Leap responded “with similar changes to the pricing of 
add-on features.”46 
The 15th Wireless Report illustrates other examples of price rivalry, 
including an important price reduction in 2009 by Sprint Nextel, “which 
allow[ed] unlimited mobile-to-mobile calling to any domestic wireless 
number, rather than a limited selection of designated wireless and wireline 
numbers.”47 It also notes that the nationwide operators’ movement into 
prepaid services “continues to put pressure on smaller traditional prepaid 
service providers to revamp their pricing plans and lower the prices of 
their own unlimited prepaid service offerings.”48 This is the epitome of 
competition. 
Although the FCC reviewed this evidence of price rivalry in both 
reports, it failed to put appropriate weight on this type of evidence when 
assessing whether the wireless industry was competitively supplied. 
Moreover, the FCC appears to consider certain new services offerings as 
disadvantageous, including unlimited calling to a select group of numbers: 
“While the monthly bill remains unchanged, the additional features are 
designed to create a perception that consumers are getting more value for 
their money.”49 Does this mean that the FCC believes that such features are 
of no value to customers? If so, the report does not explain the basis for this 
view. Generally, the FCC appears to be putting less weight on expressed 
customer preferences and more on its own subjective judgment regarding 
what constitutes added value. 
The most recent significant price cut among national carriers occurred 
on January 15, 2010, when Verizon reduced its national unlimited voice 
plans by $30 per month; AT&T followed shortly thereafter with a nearly 
identical reduction in its national plans.50 AT&T and Verizon were 
responding to the introduction of low-price unlimited plans by Leap 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Id. at para. 102 (emphasis added). 
 45. Id. at para. 103. 
 46. Id. 
 47. 15th Wireless Report, supra note 4, at para. 82. 
 48. Id. at para. 83 (emphasis added). 
 49. 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at para. 90 (emphasis added). 
 50. Sinead Carew, Verizon, AT&T Cut Fees, Expand Price War, REUTERS (Jan. 15, 
2010, 11:24 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/01/15/us-verizon-idUKTRE60E2MI 
20100115. 
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(September 16, 2009)51 and by MetroPCS (January 12, 2010).52 Moreover, 
with a few exceptions, the Verizon and AT&T price reductions occurred 
largely at the “high end” of the voice services marketplace.53 Leap and 
MetroPCS continued to offer service options at far lower prices than either 
Verizon or AT&T.54 
Other sources corroborate evidence of competitive pricing. According 
to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the CPI for “wireless telephone services,” 
there has been a downward trend since 2001.55 The same basket of wireless 
services in January 2011 cost consumers 12 percent less than what it cost in 
January 2001, and 42 percent less than what it cost in January 1998.56 And 
because the CPI cannot easily account for increases in call quality, this 
index understates the true decrease in the quality-adjusted price of wireless 
telephony.  
Wireless prices are not just declining for users who consume all-you-
can-eat plans. The proliferation of post-paid plans with limited minutes and 
affordable pre-paid plans are addressing important segments of consumer 
demand. In Washington, D.C., for example, not including daily pre-paid 
plans, there were ten distinct wireless plans offered by five distinct carriers 
that cost less than $40 per month in the summer of 2011.57 
In another analysis of wireless prices, Bank of America/Merrill Lynch 
Research reported that the average revenue per voice minute among U.S. 
wireless carriers was $0.04 in the second quarter of 2010. Figure 2 shows 
the revenue per voice minute by country.58 
                                                                                                                 
 51. See Phil Goldstein, Leap Launches New Plans, Expands Distribution, FIERCE 
WIRELESS (Sept. 16, 2009, 10:54 AM), http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/leap-launching-
new-plans-wider-retail-distribution/2009-09-16?utm_medium=rss&utm_source=rss&cmp-
id=OTC-RSS-FW0. 
 52. See Press Release, MetroPCS, MetroPCS Introduces Wireless for All Nationwide 
Serv. Plans with No Hidden Terms or Reg. Fees (Jan. 12, 2010), available at 
http://investor.metropcs.com/External.File?t=2&item=g7rqBLVLuv81UAmrh20Mp1SQDr
UR8+CcS+LduZS93g9u/U9GU3Ii4rpzOxT6eJx+vgeMbyJkN366UtDmy1TQpw==. 
 53. Carew, supra note 50 (“Some experts still believe the impact is limited. Pacific 
Crest Securities analyst Steve Clement said only about a million customers use Verizon’s 
$99.99 a month unlimited voice service today.”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, CPI DETAILED REPORT 86 
(April 2009), http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid0904.pdf. 
 56. See id. at 79; see also BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, CPI 
DETAILED REPORT (January 2011), http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid1101.pdf. 
 57. See infra app. 1. 
 58. Robert F. Roche, Vice President of Research, CTIA, Presentation at CTIA: U.S. 
Wireless Industry Overview, slide 20 (Aug. 4, 2010). 
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Figure 2: Average Revenue Per Voice Minute, 2009 
 
U.S. wireless prices are cheaper than everywhere else, including in very 
similar countries like Canada.  
Indeed, some U.S. carriers are reporting declines in their ARPU, 
which usually indicates a lack of market power. According to SNL Kagan, 
all wireless carriers experienced reductions in voice ARPU (as opposed to 
data ARPU) from Q4 2009 through Q4 2010, with a weighted average 
decline across the industry of 10.9 percent.59 Total wireless ARPU 
(including voice and data revenue) similarly declined as illustrated in Table 
1. Although AT&T experienced a decline in total ARPU from 2008 to 
2010, its decline (1.8 percent) was smaller than its peers (3.9 percent to 
19.5 percent), likely because AT&T’s subscribers consume more data 
services than non-AT&T subscribers—that is, its increase in data ARPU 
partially offset its decline in voice ARPU.60 
 
                                                                                                                 
 59. AT&T led the way with a 10.2 percent reduction, followed by Verizon (8.2 percent 
reduction), T-Mobile (7.3 percent reduction), and Sprint Nextel (2.6 percent reduction). See 
John Fletcher, Wireless ARPUs Compared to Macroeconomic Indicators, SNL KAGAN, 
(Mar. 10, 2011). 









Source: Bank of America Merrill Lynch Research, April 2010
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Table 1: Total Wireless ARPU61 
Carrier 2008 2009 2010 % Change 
2008-2010 
Leap Wireless 43.52 40.26 37.76 -13.2% 
MetroPCS 41.39 40.68 39.79 -3.9% 
Sprint Nextel Corporation 53.25 43.25 42.85 -19.5% 
Verizon Communications, 
Inc. 
51.59 48.94 46.62 -9.6% 
AT&T Inc. 50.60 50.63 49.68 -1.8% 
T-Mobile 51.25 47.25 46.50 -9.3% 
 These declining-price data are consistent with a recent GAO report 
that calculated that wireless prices declined 50 percent from 1999 to 
2009.62 Another analysis by Recon Analytics estimated that the average 
monthly bill for wireless services declined from $47.46 in 2005 to $33.02 
in 2010, a decline of roughly one-third.63 
Prices for text messaging are also declining. According to Nielsen, the 
effective price per text message declined from approximately $.06 to $.01 
from 2005 to 2010.64 Nielsen also reports that since 2008 the cost of data 
                                                                                                                 
61.  John Fletcher, Wireless ARPUs Compared to Macroeconomic Indicators, SNL 
(Mar. 10, 2010, 7:10 PM), http://www.snl.com/interactivex/article.aspx?id=124638 
8&KLPT=6; SNL, LEAP WIRELESS 2010 ANNUAL REPORT (2010); METROPCS: WIRELESS 
FOR ALL: ANNUAL REPORT 2010 (2010); SNL, LEAP WIRELESS 2009 ANNUAL REPORT (2009); 
SNL, METROPCS: WIRELESS FOR ALL: ANNUAL REPORT 2009 (2009);  SNL, LEAP WIRELESS 
2008 ANNUAL REPORT (2008); SNL, METROPCS: WIRELESS FOR ALL: ANNUAL REPORT 2008 
(2008).  
 62. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGHLIGHTS OF GAO-10-779, 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ENHANCED DATA COLLECTION COULD HELP FCC BETTER MONITOR 
COMPETITION IN THE WIRELESS INDUSTRY (2010). 
 63. Roger Entner, Entner: What Is the Price of a Megabyte of Wireless Data?, FIERCE 
WIRELESS (Apr. 13, 2011, 9:18 PM), http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/entner-what-
price-megabyte-wireless-data/2011-04-13. 
 64. Id. (citing Nielsen Customer Value Metrics, effective price per message). 
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services has declined nearly 90 percent from $0.47 per MB down to only 
$0.05 per MB.65 Figure 3 depicts these price declines.  
 
Figure 3: Effective Price Per Message/MB/MOU for Data Service66 
  
Even more impressively, these price declines have occurred despite 
wireless usage increasing dramatically.67 CTIA recently reported that 
billable minutes of use amounted to roughly 2.3 trillion for the last twelve 
months ending in June 2010,68 up 1 percent year-to-year, and that SMS/text 
messages amounted to 1.8 billion for the last twelve months ending in June 
2010,69 up 33 percent year-to-year. Data traffic increased 50 percent to 
161.5 billion MB in the first six months of 2010.70  
Another measure of the growing usage in wireless is handset sales. A 
recent report by Strategy Analytics demonstrates that the United States 
leads the world in smartphone sales with sales estimated at $100 million in 
2011.71 The United States also leads the world in mobile broadband 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. (citing Nielsen Customer Value Metrics, effective price per unit). 
66.   Id. 
 67. Over the short run, accommodating demand increases is expensive and generally 
forces unit costs upwards (assuming upward sloping short-run supply curves), which can 
lead to higher wireless prices. Over the long run, carriers may be able to invest to expand 
their networks and bring unit costs back down, but spectrum scarcity will always limit this 
ability. 
 68. 50 Wireless Quick Facts, CTIA ADVOCACY, http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/research 
/index. cfm/AID/10377 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Thomas Kang, Strategy Analytics, Global Smartphone Sales Forecast by Country: 
Americas, STRATEGY ANALYTICS (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.strategyanalytics.com/ 
default.aspx?mod=reportsabstractviewer&a0-6665. 
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subscribers with 2011 mobile broadband subs of 203 million.72 The FCC 
incorrectly suggests that U.S. mobile penetration “is lower than average 
mobile penetration in Western Europe”73 by citing a penetration metric that 
measures SIM cards, not the actual number of wireless customers. Given 
the predominance of pre-paid service in Europe, however, an individual 
customer may hold several unexpired SIM cards. Europeans may also have 
multiple SIM cards for use in traveling to different countries, making 
comparisons based on SIM card count misleading.74 That wireless prices 
have declined in spite of an outward shift in demand suggests that the 
wireless carriers have failed to restrict supply, a hallmark of market power.  
Many of these pricing metrics and usage statistics are captured in the 
15th Wireless Report. For example, the report demonstrates that voice 
revenue per minute has consistently declined for much of the last two 
decades,75 including a decline of 9 percent from 2008 to 2009.76 Price per 
text dropped for the fifth consecutive year, falling by 25 percent in 2009.77 
The price per megabit of data traffic dropped even more dramatically.78 
Overall, ARPU also declined from $47.09 in 2008 to $45.85 in 2009.79 
With regard to increased usage, the report notes that wireless connections 
and wireless internet access subscribers increased in 2009;80 devices in use 
capable of 200 kbps and higher increased in 2009;81 and adoption rates 
across mobile data services are up.82  
Given the impressive direct evidence on wireless pricing, it is difficult 
to understand the FCC’s recent reluctance to conclude that U.S. wireless 
markets are effectively competitively supplied. As demonstrated next, any 
contrary view cannot be defended on the basis of exclusion either, as 
myriad new providers have entered the wireless market.  
                                                                                                                 
 72. OECD, Broadband Statistics (June 2011). 
 73. 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at 11428. 
 74. Mobile Operators Start to See Double, CONSULT STRAND, 
http://www.strandreports.com/sw2297.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2012). Wireless penetration 
in the United States, defined as the number of active units divided by the total United States 
and territorial population, reached 96 percent in December 2010. See U.S. Wireless 
Industry-Quick Facts, supra note 68. Although many European nations enjoy penetration 
rates in excess of 100 percent—that is, more units than population—differences at those 
levels are not as economically meaningful. Id. 
 75. 15th Wireless Report, supra note 4, at 9784 tbl.20. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at para. 193 (citing Morgan Stanley).  
 78. Id. at para. 194 (citing AT&T’s price per MB of data traffic for 2008 through 2010).  
 79. Id. at para. 203. 
 80. Id. at para. 158. 
 81. Id. at para. 161. 
 82. Id. at paras. 9763–64 charts 8–9.  
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IV. DIRECT EVIDENCE OF ENTRY BY NEW SUPPLIERS DOES NOT 
SUGGEST MARKET POWER 
A second direct measure of market power is the ability to exclude 
rivals. If incumbents are successful at excluding rivals, then we should 
observe foreclosure-induced exit and no entry. Although some firms have 
been acquired (Centennial and Alltel), we are not aware of any evidence of 
forced exit due to the withholding of a critical input by an incumbent 
carrier, and entry into the wireless services market has been robust. In the 
14th Wireless Report, the FCC considered entry by several firms to 
represent “commitments that are large enough to be consistent with entry 
that could introduce new competitive constraints at the regional or national 
level.”83 (The 15th Wireless Report used nearly the identical language.)84 
In particular, the FCC described the entry by Clearwire,85 Leap, MetroPCS, 
and Cox as economically significant.86 The FCC’s appraisal is corroborated 
by investment analysts like J.P. Morgan Equity Research, which explained 
that the wireless industry “remains one of high and aggressive 
competition,” with each market served by “an average of 5 to 6 players,” 
and that Clearwire and LightSquared87 “represent two potential new 
                                                                                                                 
 83. 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at para. 68. 
 84. 15th Wireless Report, supra note 4, at para. 67 (“Below we summarize entry 
commitments that are large enough to be consistent with entry that could introduce new 
competitive constraints at the regional or national level.”). 
 85. Although Clearwire reported capital issues in mid-2011, these are likely 
overwrought. See Gary Kim, Clearwire: Bankruptcy Cannot Be Discounted, NEXT 
GENERATION COMM. (Mar. 25, 2011), http://next-generation-communications.tmcnet.com/ 
topics/nextgen-voice/articles/158005-clearwire-bankruptcy-cannot-be-discounted.htm. Even 
if Clearwire is under financial pressure, the capacity from its wireless network—and the 
resulting downward pressure on wireless prices—will not go away, even in the event of a 
bankruptcy.  
 86. 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at paras. 68–69, 72–73. In May 2011, Cox 
announced that it planned to decommission its own network build, and to become a Sprint 
mobile virtual network operator. Karl Bode, Cox Scraps Wireless Build, Will Stick to Sprint 
MVNO, DSL REPORTS (May 24, 2011), http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/Cox-Scraps-
Wireless-Build-Will-Stick-to-Sprint-MVNO-114374?nocomment=1. 
 87. In early June 2011, LightSquared acknowledged interference problems with some 
GPS systems, but maintained that technical solutions were available. See Amy Schatz, 
House Members Take GPS Worries to FCC, WALL ST. J. (June 7, 2011, 7:33 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/06/07/house-members-take-gps-worries-to-fcc/. By late 
June 2011, the company announced that “it will use a lower-frequency chunk of its 10MHz 
block of spectrum, further away from the GPS frequencies, and lower the maximum 
authorized power of its base stations by more than 50%.” John Cox, LightSquared Proposes 
Spectrum Change to Allay GPS Concerns, NETWORK WORLD (June 24, 2011, 9:52 AM), 
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2011/062411-lightsquared-spectrum-change.html?hpg 
1=bn. See also Phil Cusick, U.S. Telecom Services & Towers, J.P MORGAN EQUITY 
RESEARCH 10 (Jan. 13, 2011), https://www.gazhoo.com/upload/document/2011/01/26/ 
201101260521185412.swf. 
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entrants that may have a lower cost structure than incumbent players.”88 
This last point on cost advantages is important: To the extent that Clearwire 
and LightSquared’s costs are less than the incumbent carriers, economic 
theory would suggest that wireless prices are heading even lower. 
As it did with the pricing evidence, the 14th and 15th Wireless 
Reports ably summarize the evidence on entry. According to the FCC, 
Clearwire is not some fly-by-night entrant: It enjoys financial support from 
Sprint Nextel, Comcast and Google.89 Leap and MetroPCS are, according 
to the 14th Wireless Report, making “important” entry into new geographic 
markets.90 The 15th Wireless Report devotes subsections to Clearwire, 
Leap and MetroPCS, Atlantic Tele-Network, and Cox in its section 
detailing committed entry in the wireless market.91 Yet this direct evidence 
of entry is downplayed in both reports, while the (indirect) market share 
measures are highlighted.  
New players are emerging with different models and networks. For 
example, LightSquared’s hybrid satellite-terrestrial network and wholesale 
business model could provide an advantage for firms like Leap and 
Clearwire. Even regional carriers like U.S. Cellular seem poised to expand 
and increase competition.92 These entrants, some of whom hold large 
amounts of unused spectrum, could soon offer technologically cutting-edge 
services, which makes their entry all the more disruptive.  
A.   Clearwire 
Clearwire has significant holdings of 2.5 GHz spectrum nationwide.93 
Clearwire itself touts this strong spectrum position as providing a “unique 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Cusick, supra note 87, at 10.  
 89. 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at para. 69. As of December 2010, Sprint held 
approximately 53.9 percent of the voting power of Clearwire; Google held approximately 
3.0 percent of the voting power of Clearwire; Intel held approximately 10.3 percent of the 
voting power of Clearwire; Time Warner Cable held approximately 4.7 percent of the voting 
power of Clearwire; and Comcast held 8.9 percent of the voting power of Clearwire. 
CLEARWIRE CORP., ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 4 (2011), available at 
http://corporate.clearwire.com/common/down load/sec.cfm?companyid 
=CLWR&fid=950123-11-16614&cik=1442505.   
 90. 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at para. 72. 
 91. 15th Wireless Report, supra note 4, at paras. 68–72. 
 92. In the first quarter of 2010, U.S. Cellular reversed its previous two quarters of 
subscriber losses, bringing its total subscribers to 6.14 million. Phil Goldstein, U.S. Cellular 
Appoints New CEO, Posts Weaker Subscriber Growth, FIERCE WIRELESS (May 10, 2010, 
11:02 AM), http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/u-s-cellular-appoints-new-ceo-posts-
weaker-subscriber-growth/2010-05-10.   
 93. 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at para. 69. 
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and sustainable advantage” over competitors.94 Clearwire’s service 
offerings currently consist of voice service (VoIP) and wireless data 
services (both fixed and mobile). As of April 2011, Clearwire had 
approximately 4.4 million subscribers (of which 3.3 million were wholesale 
subscribers through Clearwire investors);95 Clearwire’s 4G network was 
available in seventy-one cities across the United States and covered an 
estimated 120 million people, including major metropolitan areas such as 
Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, San 
Francisco, and Washington, D.C.96  
B.   Leap Wireless (Cricket)  
Leap has enjoyed impressive growth. In the first quarter of 2011, 
Leap enjoyed faster subscriber growth than either AT&T or Verizon.97 The 
carrier competes against larger rivals by offering unlimited national voice 
and data plans to customers who seek low rates and flexible contract 
lengths. Sprint Nextel views Leap (along with MetroPCS, reviewed below) 
as a legitimate competitor, no longer as a fringe player.98 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Clearwire’s Thoughts on Unlimited Data Plans and Tiered Pricing, CLEAR (Jun. 
8, 2010, 9:11 AM), http://clear.com/blog/clearwires-thoughts-on-unlimited-data-plans-and-
tiered-pricing/ (noting that its “cost efficient, high capacity, and highly-scalable all IP-
network backbone, combined with our unmatched spectrum position gives us a unique and 
sustainable advantage to serve our retail and wholesale businesses.”). 
 95. Todd Spangler, Clearwire, Comcast and Sprint Widen 4G Reach to D.C, Baltimore, 
MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Apr. 20, 2011, 5:39 PM), http://www.multichannel.com/article/ 
467098-Clearwire_Comcast_And_Sprint_Widen_4G_Reach_In_D_C_Baltimore.php. 
 96. Press Release, Clearwire, Clearwire and Locus Communications Announce New 
4G Wholesale Agreement (Apr. 7, 2011), available at http://corporate.clearwire.com/ 
releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=563465; CLEARWIRE CORP., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) 2–
3, 6–8 (Feb. 24, 2010), available at http://corporate.clearwire.com/common/download/ 
sec.cfm?companyid=CLWR&fid=950123-10-16444&cik=1442505. 
 97. Leap reported 331,000 net adds in the first quarter of 2011, bringing its total 
subscribers to 5.84 million for an increase of 6.01 percent from its December 2010 
subscribers. Phil Goldstein, Leap Adds Fewer Subscribers in Q1, but Improves Churn, 
FIERCEWIRELESS (May 4, 2011, 4:34 PM), http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/leap-adds-
fewer-subscribers-q1-improves-churn/2011-05-04. Verizon reported 1.8 million net adds for 
the first quarter of 2011, bringing its total subscribers to 104 million for an increase of 1.76 
percent from its December 2010 subscribers. AT&T reported 2 million net adds in the first 
quarter of 2011, bringing its total subscribers to 97.5 million for an increase of 2.09 percent 
from its December 2010 subscribers. Sue Marek, Verizon Activated 2.2M iPhones in Q1, 
Sees Strong ThunderBolt Demand, FIERCEWIRELESS (April 21, 2011, 10:53 AM), 
http://www.fierce wireless.com/story/verizon-activates-22m-iphones-q1-sees-strong-
thunderbolt-demand/ 2011-04-21. 
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Mostly through its Cricket subsidiary, Leap offers wireless service in 
thirty-five states covering 100 million people.99 Leap hopes to rapidly 
expand to cover 280 million people in all fifty states.100 As of January 
2012, Leap had 6 million wireless subscribers,101 and it held spectrum in 
thirty-five of the fifty largest U.S. markets.102 The 14th Wireless Report 
documented Leap’s impressive rise over the past several years, noting that 
Leap expanded its coverage by 26.6 million people from 2008 to 2009 
(from 53.9 million to 80.5 million).103   
Even more important, Leap has positioned itself as a low-cost 
provider, which makes it all the more difficult for its larger rivals to raise 
prices. Nearly 80 percent of Cricket customers are living in households 
earning less than $50,000 a year.104 Leap represents a decidedly different 
option for customers not interested in becoming AT&T or Verizon 
subscribers. Indeed, Leap highlights this difference in its marketing 
materials, including the slogan “half the cost of AT&T and Verizon.”105 
In addition, Leap has targeted data-intensive subscribers.106 Leap has 
seen significant increases in smartphone adoption by its customer base in 
                                                                                                                 
VlkNgscyrJWow (“Our prepaid services compete with several regional carriers, including 
Metro PCS and Leap Wireless, which offer competitively-priced prepaid calling plans that 
include unlimited local calling.”).   
 99. Mike Freeman, Leap Wireless’ Cricket Hops on to National Stage, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 12, 2010 7:38 PM), http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/sep/ 
12/leap/. 
 100. 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at para. 72 (“Leap, which holds many PCS 
licenses and AWS licenses (acquired at the 2006 auction) in markets throughout much of the 
country . . . .”); see also id. (“expanding its potential subscriber base from around 100 
million people in 35 states to 280 million people in all 50 states.”). 
 101. See Company Information, CRICKET, http://www.mycricket.com/learn/company-
information (last accessed on Jan. 13, 2012). 
 102. LEAP WIRELESS INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) 3 (March 1, 2010), available 
at http://investor.leapwireless.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=95536&p=irol-sec (select “Annual 
Filings” in “Groupings Filter” box; then click “Search”; then click button corresponding to 
desired document format on line for Mar, 1, 2010 10-K form). 
 103. 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at para. 72. 
 104. Freeman, supra note 99. 
 105. See Android Smartphone, CRICKET, http://www.mycricket.com/smartphones/ 
android (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
 106. Press Release, Leap Wireless Int’l, Cricket Enters into 4G Agreement with 
LightSquared (Mar. 22, 2011), available at http://leapwireless.mediaroom.com/index. 
php?s=13383&item=30563 (“Our business progress demonstrates how data services are 
increasingly important to our customers, as evidenced by our customers' significant uptake 
of smartphones and data-focused, higher-ARPU service plans. We intend to deploy our own 
LTE networks beginning this year to complement the existing nationwide 3G services we 
currently offer to customers. This new roaming arrangement will allow us to offer customers 
an even-greater 4G service area as LightSquared expands its own network.” (quoting Doug 
Hutcheson, Leap’s President and CEO). 
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2010, with 10 percent of subscribers moving to smartphones in the fourth 
quarter of 2010, accounting for 40 percent of new handset sales.107 As of 
2010, Leap offered 3G service in all of its markets, covering around 92 
million people, and through an agreement with Sprint, Leap covers 280 
million people with 3G service.108 
As of April 2011, Leap was testing 4G services, and it entered into an 
agreement with LightSquared, a commercial wholesaler, to offer 4G 
roaming services outside of its footprint.109 Leap hopes to launch its 
commercial 4G trial in late 2011.110 
C.   MetroPCS 
Like Leap, MetroPCS has been expanding its offerings rapidly. 
MetroPCS ended the first quarter of 2011 with more than 8.8 million 
subscribers, an increase of 726,000 subscribers relative to the fourth quarter 
of 2010.111 Since 2002, MetroPCS has increased its customer base by 
nearly 1,500 percent.112 MetroPCS holds PCS and AWS spectrum 
throughout the United States, and it has been rapidly expanding its 
coverage to 90 percent of the United States.113 In September 2008, 
MetroPCS signed a long-term deal with Leap, and it now offers service for 
a flat monthly fee without any roaming charges.114 MetroPCS offers 
nationwide coverage through its Metro USA nationwide service.115 From 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Mike Dano, Leap Plans Wi-Fi-only ViewSonic Android Tablet, More Android 
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 108. Press Release, Leap Wireless Int’l, Cricket Enters into National 3G Data Roaming 
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 109. Cricket Enters into 4G Roaming Agreement with LightSquared, supra note 106.  
 110. LEAP WIRELESS INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 102, at 3.  
 111. Grading the Top Ten Carriers in the First Quarter of 2011, FIERCEWIRELESS, 
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(last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
 112. See Metro PCS, Presentation at the Bank of America Credit Conference slide 12 
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 113. See 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at paras. 72, 155. 
 114. See Press Release, MetroPCS, Leap Wireless International, Inc. and MetroPCS 
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Agreement and Settle Litigation (Sept. 29, 2008) (on file with MetroPCS Communications, 
Inc. and Leap Wireless International, Inc). 
 115. MetroPCS has nationwide service, covering 280 million POPS and over 8 million 
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Call Transcript, SEEKING ALPHA (May 3, 2011, 9:00 A.M.), http://seekingalpha.com/ 
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transcript. 
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October 2008 through October 2009, MetroPCS expanded its coverage 
from 56 million to 84.6 million people (an increase of 28.6 million 
potential subscribers).116 MetroPCS believes that it has a footprint that 
rivals or exceeds that of Sprint.117 
MetroPCS offers low-cost plans that place significant pricing pressure 
on its rivals. Its “Wireless for All” plan, which ranges from forty dollars to 
sixty dollars per month, has made significant inroads in the marketplace.118 
Because it enjoys such low incremental costs (one estimate places its costs 
at less than twenty dollars per month), MetroPCS can offer lower prices 
while maintaining profitability.119 Although MetroPCS has a smaller 
subscriber base than AT&T or Verizon, as the low-cost pricing plan in the 
marketplace, the disparity in size should decrease over time. (The same is 
true for Leap.) Like any new product, it takes time for an advertising 
campaign to work and for customers to consider new options. 
MetroPCS is also pushing the boundaries of high-speed data service. 
In fact, MetroPCS is the first carrier in the United States to offer Long 
Term Evolution (“LTE”) service to its customers, and it has expanded its 
4G coverage to Tampa, Atlanta, Jacksonville, Miami, Orlando, Boston, 
Dallas-Fort Worth, Detroit, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, New York, 
Philadelphia, Sacramento, and San Francisco.120 The company seeks to 
finish “phase-1” 4G-LTE buildout sometime in 2011, and it will complete 
“phase-2” of the buildout by the end of 2012—by which point MetroPCS 
will carry LTE on all of its 11,000 cell sites.121 Further, MetroPCS offers 
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cutting-edge smartphones with access to its quickly expanding 4G 
network.122 Further, because LTE uses spectrum far more efficiently than 
3G services, MetroPCS can not only offer high-end wireless services on a 
faster network, but it will also have the spectrum resources to satisfy its 
growing number of 4G subscribers and increased voice and text 
messages.123 
In sum, both Leap and MetroPCS are becoming major players in the 
wireless industry. The two firms together cover over two-thirds of the U.S. 
population, and they serve twenty-one of the top twenty-five markets 
nationwide. Because Leap and MetroPCS have complimentary coverage, 
their roaming agreement is all the more powerful.124 As one analyst put it, 
through their roaming agreement, Leap and MetroPCS have effectively 
formed “the fifth nationwide carrier.”125 In fact, Verizon estimates that 
Leap and MetroPCS have achieved “penetration rates of between 8 and 13 
percent in markets where they have been active for five or more years.”126 
According to prior CMRS Competition Reports, the business models of 
Leap and MetroPCS are so compelling that the larger rivals mimicked their 
“all you can eat” service plans that are month-to-month at a flat rate.127 It is 
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precisely this ability to force competitors to follow pricing cuts that enables 
firms to significantly alter the competitive landscape for years to come.  
D.   LightSquared 
LightSquared expects to cover 260 million people in the United States 
with its wireless broadband network by 2015.128 LightSquared will operate 
as a wholesale supplier to carriers looking to create or expand LTE wireless 
broadband coverage.129 LightSquared plans on covering the entire nation 
with 4G LTE service.130 Relative to a carrier like MetroPCS (which holds 
between 10 and 40 MHz of spectrum depending on the market), 
LightSquared currently has a significant spectrum position with 59 MHz of 
1.6 GHz spectrum nationwide.131 LightSquared will assist upstart carriers 
by providing them access to a high quality 4G network. In March 2011, 
LightSquared entered into an agreement with Leap to supply LTE roaming 
services.132 In June 2011, LightSquared was close to completing a network-
sharing agreement with Sprint, under which “LightSquared would pay $2 
billion a year to rent space on Sprint’s network to launch its own high-
speed wireless services.”133 Currently, LightSquared hopes to cover 100 
million people by the end of 2012, on route to its target of 260 million by 
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2015.134 As of the first quarter of 2011, the company had entertained 
partnerships with more than sixty companies (fifteen of which are beyond 
initial negotiations), including Time Warner Cable.135  
E.   Super Regional Carriers (U.S. Cellular, Cellular South, and 
Atlantic Tele-Network) 
Large regional carriers, called “Super Regionals,” have also expanded 
their existing services, which further undermines any hint of exclusion by 
incumbent carriers. Also referred to as “non-nationwide service 
providers,”136 Super Regionals offer service regionally, but, through 
roaming agreements, they offer their customers the ability to call from 
anywhere in the country. As of 2011, U.S. Cellular served twenty-six states 
and 6.1 million subscribers (95 percent of which are contract customers).137 
Some of the major metropolitan areas served by U.S. Cellular are Madison, 
Milwaukee, Oklahoma City, and St. Louis.138 U.S. Cellular provides 3G 
services to approximately 98 percent of its subscriber footprint, and it has 
announced plans to test LTE in late 2011, with a full launch coming by 
2012.139 The initial launch was announced to occur in two dozen markets 
in time for the 2011 holiday season.140 The company plans to grow a new 
line of LTE devices and service offerings as it expands its network into 
new markets. 141  
Cellular South, Inc. is another Super Regional carrier, with a focus on 
the southeastern part of the United States.142 The company currently has 
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880,000 subscribers,143 and it offers low-cost nationwide plans.144 Cellular 
South operates a CDMA-based network, and it has announced plans to 
deploy LTE in the fourth quarter of 2011.145 The company also recently 
purchased 700 MHz spectrum, which should allow it to expand its service 
to all of Mississippi, Tennessee, and Alabama.146 Cellular South’s 
acquisition of this spectrum places the company in an excellent position to 
compete with larger competitors in the southeastern part of the United 
States. 
The 15th Wireless Report recognizes Atlantic Tele-Network (“ATN”) 
as a “new entrant in the U.S. mobile wireless retail services 
marketplace.”147 Formed via the acquisition of twenty-six of the divestiture 
markets from the Verizon-Alltel transaction in April 2010, ATN offers 
wireless voice and data services under the Alltel name in rural markets 
located principally in the Southeast and Midwest.148 The report notes that 
as of June 2010, ATN had approximately 807,000 subscribers, “making 
them the ninth largest mobile wireless facilities-based provider, with a 
network footprint covering approximately six million POPs.”149 
V. MARKET STRUCTURE ANALYSIS PRESUMES A STRICT 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRICES AND NUMBER OF PROVIDERS 
Ignoring the direct evidence of the lack of market power, the 14th and 
15th Wireless Reports rely heavily on a market-structure analysis in 
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refraining from declaring the wireless industry is effectively competitive. 
Given the highly differentiated product offerings in U.S. wireless markets, 
however, there is little basis to presume such a relationship. The structure-
conduct paradigm grows out of the Cournot model,150 which assumes that 
firms compete by choosing the level of output (as opposed to prices), and 
that all firms’ products are homogenous (as opposed to being 
differentiated). Although more elaborate versions of the model 
accommodate other forms of competitive interaction, the relationship 
between price-cost markup and industry concentration (the HHI) is more 
established under the homogenous products assumption. Indeed, when this 
relationship between market structure and price-cost margin is derived in 
the seminal textbook on industrial organization, the authors make the 
simplifying assumption that “[a]n oligopoly consists of n identical firms 
that produce a homogenous product..”151 As Carl Shapiro, the Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General for Economic Analysis at the Department of 
Justice explains:  
For homogeneous products, the traditional structural approach of 
defining markets and measuring market shares and market 
concentration has deep roots, along with a rich empirical tradition 
linking market structure to performance. In these markets, it is both 
natural and appropriate to count up each firm’s unit or dollar sales, or 
capacity, to measure market shares, and to make inferences about a 
merger’s effects based on market structure, including the HHI of 
market concentration. The danger of collusion is surely related to 
market concentration (although quantifying this relationship is 
difficult), and economists’ primary model of non-cooperative 
oligopolistic competition among manufacturers of homogeneous goods 
[the Cournot model] relates market structure to performance. 
Although economists continue to debate the empirical relationship 
between market structure and performance, there exists a solid 
foundation for using market structure prominently in evaluating 
horizontal mergers involving homogeneous goods. This traditional 
structural approach towards merger policy, which dates back to the 
1960s but has been refined as just described, is less attractive for 
differentiated products. When products are highly differentiated, 
concerns about coordinated effects may be secondary to concerns 
about unilateral effects. And, to assess unilateral effects most 
accurately, it is highly desirable to go beyond industry concentration 
measures to look directly at the extent of competition between the 
merging brands. This is especially true if competition is “localized,” 
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i.e., if some brands are especially close substitutes for other brands due 
to their product characteristics or image.152  
Yet, the wireless marketplace clearly does not operate like this highly 
simplified textbook model. Competition in wireless markets occurs along 
several dimensions. Carriers differentiate themselves using varied pricing 
structures (for example, free in-network calling), service quality, and 
devices.153 When the homogenous products assumption is violated, the 
predictions of the structure-conduct paradigm are often unreliable.  
In its 14th and 15th Wireless Reports, the FCC did not offer any 
evidence of a structure-conduct relationship, though the organization of the 
reports clearly supposes that such a relationship exists.154 In particular, the 
structure-conduct relationship does not appear to hold across the relevant 
range of carriers today—namely, four-to-six carriers per market. As 
demonstrated in Figure 1 (above), the inverse relationship between market 
structure and conduct from 2003 through 2009 is the opposite of what is 
predicted under the structure-conduct paradigm. Sections III of both reports 
discuss industry structure, while Sections IV of both reports discuss 
industry conduct, yet there is no discussion of the relationship between the 
two sections.155 The lack of a bridge between the two sections indicates 
that the FCC has not endeavored to bolster this structure-conduct 
assumption. In applying a standard market structure analysis to a dynamic, 
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technologically advanced, and differentiated product such as wireless 
services, the FCC is trying to put a square peg into a round hole. 
The number of wireless providers varies by local market, which will 
affect local concentration measures. Leap and MetroPCS are quickly 
expanding their respective footprints, and each often represents the fifth 
national carrier in a local given market after Verizon, Sprint, AT&T, and T-
Mobile.156 Of the top twenty-five U.S. wireless markets, both Leap and 
MetroPCS have entered two markets—Philadelphia and Detroit—bringing 
the total number of national carriers to six in those markets.157 In another 
four of the top twenty-five wireless markets—Seattle, Minneapolis, 
Cleveland, and Indianapolis—wireless customers have only four 
nationwide providers—that is, neither Leap nor MetroPCS has entered the 
market.158 In the remaining nineteen markets (equal to twenty-five less 
six), either Leap or MetroPCS has entered.159 Another source of local 
variation is the presence of regional carriers such as U.S. Cellular, Cellular 
South, and ATN.160 
It is theoretically possible that the four national carriers offer targeted 
discounts to customers living in local markets in which their market shares 
are relatively low (a potential indicator of the lack of local competition); if 
this is the case, then the wireless bills would reflect these targeted 
discounts. To test this structure-conduct hypothesis, we examined wireless 
billing data from TNS Telecoms.161 The database tracks 
telecomatlconsumption on a continuous basis for thousands of U.S. 
households, including the usage of local, long distance, and wireless 
telephone, cable and satellite television, and Internet service every quarter. 
TNS Telecoms combines bill data with extensive demographic information 
such as age, income, education, family status, occupation, ownership and 
size of household.  
A common measure of market structure is the HHI of a given local 
area. In its 14th Wireless Report, the FCC reported HHIs for 172 economic 
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html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
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areas in 2008.162 We analyzed the variation in total monthly wireless bills 
across all households in the TNS database from the first quarter of 2008 
through the third quarter of 2008. In particular, we regressed the total bill 
for a household on: (1) a dummy for the customer’s wireless provider; (2) a 
dummy for the state; (3) the age of the respondent; (4) the income of the 
household; (5) whether the handset is used to access the Internet; (6) 
whether the handset is used for text messaging; (7) whether the handset is 
used to access email; (8) whether a child away from the home has a 
wireless phone; (9) the number of prepaid wireless accounts; (10) the total 
number of cell lines in the household; (11) the number of months left on 
the wireless contracts; and (12) the HHI of the economic area in which the 
household resides. Under the structure-conduct hypothesis, the coefficient 























                                                                                                                 
 162. 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at 11644–47 tbl.C-3. These data were updated 
for 2009 in the 15th Wireless Report. 15th Wireless Report, supra note 4, at 9697 tbl.C-3. 
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TABLE 2: REGRESSION OUTPUT (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TOTAL 
MONTHLY BILL)163 
 HHI Regression Leap/MetroPCS Regression
 Variable Coefficient Std. error p Coefficient Std. 
error 
p 
Age of respondent -.1803545* 0.03 0.00 -.1520583* 0.02 0.00 
Midpoint of income ranges -.0000407* 0.00 0.00 -.0000416* 0.00 0.00 
Use wireless phone for 
wireless web 
9.524243* 1.22 0.00 10.17544* 1.08 0.00 
Use wireless phone for text 
messaging 
10.11118* 0.81 0.00 10.10933* 0.70 0.00 
Use wireless phone for e-mail 8.26061* 1.16 0.00 7.678402* 1.03 0.00 
Child away from home has a 
wireless phone 
3.992265** 1.59 0.01 3.602429* 1.37 0.01 
Number of prepaid wireless 
accounts 
0.50 1.08 0.64 0.83 0.96 0.39 
Total number of cellular lines 
in household 
38.79829* 0.37 0.00 38.4376* 0.32 0.00 
Number of months left on 
wireless contract 
.1772952* 0.06 0.00 .1628021* 0.05 0.00 
HHI -0.000174 0.00 0.86 NA   
Leap market NA   1.4408 0.93 0.12 
MetroPCS market NA   2.82274** 1.34 0.04 
Carrier = Sprint 3.610493* 1.35 0.01 3.366204* 1.21 0.01 
Carrier = AT&T 3.228713* 1.15 0.00 2.621129** 1.03 0.01 
Carrier = Verizon 4.188472* 1.15 0.00 4.125661* 1.03 0.00 
Constant 6.17 15.12 0.68 8.75 9.74 0.37 
As Table 2 shows, age of the household (lower bill), household 
income (lower bill), text messaging (higher bill), Internet use (higher bill), 
email use (higher bill), a child away from home on the account (higher 
bill), and the number of lines in the household (higher bill) have the 
expected sign. The carrier coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that T-Mobile (the omitted carrier) offers a slight 
discount relative to Verizon, AT&T, and Sprint. More importantly, the HHI 
coefficient is slightly negative (the opposite of what is predicted under the 
structure-conduct paradigm) and not statistically different from zero, 
indicating that wireless carriers do not alter their prices with local 
concentration levels.164 This finding is entirely inconsistent with the 
                                                                                                                 
163.  Notes: * Statistically Significant at 1 percent level; ** Statistically Significant at 10 
percent level. State dummies omitted from table. First specification: N = 7,681; R squared = 
0.67. Second specification: N = 9,739; R squared = 0.68. Missing values for certain TNS 
fields were replaced with average values. 
 164. As recognized in the 15th Wireless Report, from the customer’s perspective, the 
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structure-conduct hypothesis that undergirds the FCC’s market share 
analysis. As demonstrated in Appendix 2, our finding is robust to the 
regression specification.165 
Finally, to further test the structure-conduct hypothesis, we replaced 
the HHI variable in the above regression with dummies for Leap or 
MetroPCS markets. A market was designated as a Leap (or MetroPCS) 
market if at any time in the TNS sample data there was a bill from a Leap 
customer living in the area. Because we recovered observations for which 
there was no HHI data from the FCC, the sample expanded from 7,681 to 
9,739. As Table 2 shows, the coefficients on Leap and MetroPCS markets 
are slightly positive (the MetroPCS market dummy is statistically 
significant), again undermining the hypothesis that the market structure (at 
least over the current range of four to six carriers) affects prices. This 
analysis undermines the fundamental premise of the FCC’s market 
structure analysis—namely, that market structure is a predictor for market 
performance.  
Even assuming counterfactually that a relationship exists between 
market structure and pricing, the wireless market is not conducive to the 
exercise of market power. Competition in most markets, by the FCC’s own 
calculation, is strong. The 14th Wireless Report estimates that 91.3 percent 
of the U.S. population lives in census blocks served by four or more mobile 
operators.166 In comparison, 65.5 percent of the rural population lives in 
census blocks with at least four competing mobile voice operators.167 The 
15th Wireless Report estimated that the percentage of the U.S. population 
in 2010 that could choose from five or more providers of mobile voice 
services was 89.6 percent, up from 72.8 percent in 2009.168 The report also 
notes that the percentage of the U.S. population in 2010 that could choose 
from four or more wireless broadband providers was 67.8 percent, up from 
58 percent in 2009.169 
Further, the U.S. wireless market has a lower HHI than other 
developed countries in Europe and Asia. To defend its (outdated) approach, 
                                                                                                                 
choice of carrier occurs at the local level, regardless of the pricing strategies of the carriers. 
15th Wireless Report, supra note 4, para. 47 n. 117 (“The Commission typically evaluates 
the competitive effects of transactions involving mobile wireless licenses at the CMA level 
because that is the relevant geographic market for most consumers. Consumers generally 
search for service providers in the local areas where they live, work, and travel and are 
unlikely to search for providers that do not serve their local areas.”). 
165.  See infra app. 2. 
 166. 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at para. 45. 
 167. Id. at 11427. 
 168. 15th Wireless Report, supra note 4, at 9705 tbl.5. 
 169. Id. at 9706 tbl. 7. See also 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at 11450 tbl.7. 
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the FCC argues that these nationwide concentration indices understate the 
true amount of concentration because the appropriate unit of observation is 
sub-national.170 Setting aside the inherent problems of inferences based on 
market shares,171 enhanced competition often comes in the form of regional 
carriers as well as national carriers. U.S. Cellular and Cellular South have a 
strong presence in the markets they serve. Because national carriers such as 
Leap and MetroPCS are entering local markets in a staggered fashion, 
certain local markets will exhibit less concentration than the national 
average.  
Table 3, below, shows the number of unique wireless providers by 
market for the top twenty-five U.S. wireless markets. The table does not 
include the more than sixty mobile virtual network operators that resell 






















                                                                                                                 
 170. 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at para. 364. 
 171. The U.S. HHIs are less than all the comparable countries listed by the FCC, 
including the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Canada, Australia, Sweden, France, 
Finland, and Japan. Even using the adjusted HHI proposed by the FCC of 2,848, only the 
UK would have a lower HHI. See id. at 11621 tbl.41. 
354 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64 
Table 3: Number of Unique Wireless Providers, by Market172 
Rank Market # of Unique  
Nationals 
# of Unique  
Regionals 
Total # of 
Unique 
Carriers 
1 New York, NY 5 (MetroPCS)  5 
2 Los Angeles, CA 5 (MetroPCS)  5 
3 Chicago, IL 5 (Leap) 1 (U.S. Cellular) 6 
4 Philadelphia, PA 6 (MetroPCS, 
Leap) 
 6 
5 Dallas, TX 5 (MetroPCS)  5 
6 San Francisco, CA 5 (MetroPCS)  5 
7 Boston, MA 5 (MetroPCS)  5 
8 Atlanta, GA 5 (MetroPCS)  5 
9 Washington, DC 5 (Leap)  5 
10 Houston, TX 5 (Leap)  5 
11 Detroit, MI 6 (MetroPCS, 
Leap) 
 6 
12 Phoenix, AZ 5 (Leap)  5 
13 Seattle, WA 4  4 
14 Tampa, FL 5 (MetroPCS)  5 
15 Minneapolis, MN 4 1 (U.S. Cellular) 5 
16 Denver, CO 5 (Leap)  5 
17 Miami, FL 5 (MetroPCS)  5 
18 Cleveland, OH 4  4 
19 Orlando, FL 5 (MetroPCS)  5 
20 Sacramento, CA 5 (MetroPCS)  5 
21 St. Louis, MO 5 (Leap) 1 (U.S. Cellular) 6 
22 Portland, OR 5 (Leap)  5 
23 Pittsburgh, PA 5 (Leap)  5 
24 Charlotte, NC 5 (Leap)  5 
25 Indianapolis, IN 4   4 
AVERAGE  4.92  5.04 
Based on our survey, U.S. consumers in the top twenty-five markets 
have on average 4.92 unique providers offering national service (“national 
providers”); two markets have six national providers, four other markets 
have four national providers, and the rest have five. Three of the top 
                                                                                                                 
172.  Note that the first four carriers in each market are Verizon, AT&T, Sprint Nextel, 
and T-Mobile. The counts for regional networks do not include ATN because public data on 
ATN’s coverage area is not sufficiently specific. See ATN, Our Network, ATLANTIC TELE-
NETWORK, http://www.atni.com/network.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
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twenty-five markets also have a Super Regional carrier (U.S. Cellular), 
bringing the average number of unique providers including Super 
Regionals to 5.04. (As Table 2 shows, the coefficients on Leap and 
MetroPCS markets are not negative and significant, as predicted by the 
structure-conduct hypothesis, suggesting that wireless consumers in those 
markets do not receive lower prices than the rest of the nation). Even if 
there was a relationship between market concentration and prices for some 
level of providers, the large number of unique providers in each market 
suggests that the relationship no longer holds over the relevant range of 
providers. Stated differently, while a movement from one-to-two or two-to-
three carriers in a local market might significantly affect prices, the 
movement from four-to-five carriers does not appear to be important based 
on our regression results above. 
VI. VERIZON AND AT&T DO NOT APPEAR TO POSSESS A 
“MUST-HAVE” INPUT  
The 14th Wireless Report intimates that spectrum below-1000 MHz is 
a must-have input for a carrier to compete effectively.173 Similarly, the 
15th Wireless Report devotes a section to analyzing spectrum holdings 
below-1000 MHz.174 The major difference between below-1000 MHz 
spectrum and above-1000 MHz spectrum is the cost of deployment. As 
explained by the FCC, “[a] licensee that exclusively or primarily holds 
spectrum in a higher frequency range generally must construct more cell 
sites (at additional cost) than a licensee with primary holdings at a lower 
frequency in order to provide equivalent service coverage, particularly in 
rural areas.”175 
The FCC explains that although Sprint Nextel and T-Mobile have 
some spectrum below the 1000 MHz threshold, AT&T and Verizon have 
significant holdings of this must-have input,176 allegedly giving AT&T and 
Verizon a “competitive advantage.”177 The FCC would be hard-pressed to 
                                                                                                                 
 173. Id. at paras. 268–71 (“Lower frequency bands – such as the 700 MHz and Cellular 
bands – possess more favorable intrinsic spectrum propagation characteristics than spectrum 
in higher bands.”). 
 174. 15th Wireless Report, supra note 4, at paras. 298–300. 
 175. Id. at para. 293 (citing a propagation model put forth by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, and a Okumara-Hata model).  
 176. Id. at para. 298 (“Three nationwide providers – Verizon Wireless, AT&T, and 
Sprint Nextel – hold licenses for CMRS/mobile broadband spectrum below 1 GHz, as do 
regional providers, such as US Cellular and Cellular South, MetroPCS, and several smaller 
companies, many of which have holdings in more rural areas of the country. T-Mobile, the 
fourth nationwide provider, holds one Cellular license in South Carolina.”). 
 177. Id. at para. 307 (“For instance, given the superior propagation characteristics of 
spectrum under 1 GHz, particularly for providing coverage in rural areas and for penetrating 
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explain why Clearwire is purchasing spectrum above 1000 MHz that is 
allegedly inferior.178 
By narrowly defining the market this way, the FCC appears to be 
setting the stage for imposing a limit (sometimes called a cap) on spectrum 
that AT&T and Verizon can acquire; otherwise, according to the FCC’s 
theory, the wireless industry will not be competitively supplied. In this 
section, we explain that the FCC is contradicting a position it previously 
took on this matter, and that competitors value spectrum from different 
bands differently, suggesting that one type of spectrum can be substituted 
for another. 
A.   The Nextel Re-Banding Process 
The FCC’s current position that below-1000 MHz spectrum is a 
“must-have” input contradicts its previous view of the interchangeability of 
below-1000 MHz and above-1000 MHz spectrum in the Nextel re-banding 
case. There, the FCC determined that 1900 MHz spectrum was suitable 
replacement spectrum for the 800 MHz licenses given up by Nextel. In 
particular, the FCC concluded that spectrum in the 1900 MHz band was 
“equitable compensation” for Nextel’s 700 and 800 MHz spectrum.179 
In July 2004, the FCC put into effect a new band plan for the 800 
MHz band to handle interference to public safety providers.180 The FCC 
determined that incompatible technologies between public safety providers 
operating in the 800 MHz band and Nextel were causing the interference 
and that reconfiguration of the 800 MHz and 700 MHz band was 
necessary.181 The FCC required Nextel to give up rights to certain of its 
licenses in the 800 MHz band and all of its licenses in the 700 MHz 
band.182 In exchange, Nextel should be compensated for relinquishing its 
licenses in the 700 and 800 MHz bands, as well as for paying for 
                                                                                                                 
buildings, providers whose spectrum assets include a greater amount of spectrum below 1 
GHz spectrum may possess certain competitive advantages for providing robust coverage 
when compared to licensees whose portfolio is exclusively or primarily comprised of higher 
frequency spectrum.”). 
 178. In the 15th Wireless Report, the FCC attributes Clearwire’s spectrum holdings to 
Sprint, and it notes that Sprint and Clearwire together hold 47 percent of the MHz-POPs of 
the above-1000 MHz bands, which include PCS, AWS, BRS and EBS. Id. at 9682 n.19. 
 179. Improving Pub. Safety Comm. in the 800 MHz Band, Report and Order, Fifth 
Report and Order, Fourth Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 
14969, para. 211 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 R&O]. 
 180. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, Eleventh Report, 21 F.C.C.R. 10947, para. 66 (2006) [hereinafter 11th CMRS Report]. 
 181. 2004 R&O, supra note 179, at para. 2. 
 182. 11th CMRS Report, supra note 180, at para. 66.  
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incumbent relocation costs.183 The FCC determined that this compensation 
should not be done on “megahertz-for-megahertz” basis, but instead 
“value-for-value” basis.184 Accordingly, the FCC modified Nextel’s 
licenses to provide the right to operate on two five-MHz blocks in the 1900 
MHz band.185 The FCC determined that the overall value of the 1900 MHz 
spectrum was $4.8 billion, less the cost of relocating incumbent users.186 
The value of Nextel’s average 4.5 MHz spectrum licenses in the 800 MHz 
band was $1.607 billion, but this figure was later amended to $2.1 
billion.187  
Throughout this proceeding, the selection of appropriate replacement 
spectrum for Nextel was debated thoroughly. The FCC ultimately agreed 
that 1900 MHz spectrum was suitable replacement spectrum for the 800 
MHz licenses given up by Nextel. The FCC ruled:  
We conclude that it is in the public interest to compensate Nextel for 
the surrendered spectrum rights and costs it will incur as a result of 
band reconfiguration. . . . In light of these substantial public interest 
benefits, we conclude that it is appropriate for Nextel to receive 
equitable compensation in the form of spectrum rights to the 1910-
1915 MHz and 1990-1995 MHz bands . . . .188 
This result came after several parties, most notably Verizon, argued that 
Nextel would receive spectrum in the 1900 MHz band that was more 
valuable than the spectrum in the 800 MHz band.189 Indeed, Verizon 
argued that if Nextel received spectrum in the 1900 MHz band, then 
Verizon would challenge the award in court.190 Nextel wanted the 1900 
MHz spectrum and stated that they would not accept spectrum in the 2100 
MHz band instead.191 That the FCC and Nextel perceived the 1900 MHz 
                                                                                                                 
 183. 2004 R&O, supra note 179, at paras. 210, 211, 217 (“We find that providing 
replacement spectrum rights for Nextel is a sine qua non for elimination of unacceptable 
interference in the 800 MHz band.”). Id. at para. 217. 
 184. Id. at para. 32. 
 185. Id. at para. 33. 
 186. 11th CMRS Report, supra note 180, at para. 66.   
 187. 2004 R&O, supra note 179, at para. 35. The figure was originally reported to be 
$1.607 billion, but later was amended. Improving Pub. Safety Comm. in the 800 MHz Band, 
Supplemental Order and Order on Reconsideration, 19 F.C.C.R. 25120, paras. 27–28 
(2004). To be fair, the 800 MHz spectrum was partitioned by locality, whereas the 1900 
MHz spectrum was contiguous and national. Because contiguous spectrum is more valuable 
than local spectrum, a full comparison of the relative values is complicated. 
 188. 2004 R&O, supra note 179, at para. 211. 
 189. Id. at para. 210 (“Other parties contend that the value of the spectrum rights Nextel 
seeks substantially exceeds the value of the spectrum rights it has offered to give up, and 
therefore would constitute an unwarranted windfall to Nextel.”). 
 190. Donny Jackson, Nextel Sweetens Consensus Plan, URGENT COMM. (July 1, 2004, 
12:00 PM), http://urgentcomm.com/mag/radio_nextel_sweetens_consensus/.  
 191. Id.  
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spectrum licenses to be suitable replacements for Nextel’s 700 and 800 
MHz spectrum suggests that above-1000 and below-1000 MHz spectrum is 
at least partially fungible. 
B.   Spectrum Is One of Several Inputs in the Production Process 
In the 14th Wireless Report, the FCC based its claim that below-1000 
MHz is more valuable on the relative prices paid by wireless providers for 
the two bands in recent auctions. The FCC explains:  
The recent auctions of AWS and 700 MHz spectrum (Auctions 66 and 
73, respectively) provide a basis for comparison, as both auctions 
involved large quantities of paired spectrum in a relatively close 
timeframe. In the 2008 auction of 700 MHz spectrum, the average 
price for the 700 MHz spectrum was $1.28 per MHz-pop. This unit 
price was more than twice the average price of $0.54 per MHz-pop for 
AWS spectrum [at 1700 and 2100 MHz] auctioned in 2006.192 
Given that the FCC previously noted that the cost of deploying higher 
frequency spectrum exceeded the cost of deploying lower frequency 
spectrum, the resultant price differential of this spectrum—a 
complementary input in the product process—is expected. Providers pay 
more upfront for low-frequency spectrum but less on the deployment end. 
The opposite is true for providers who purchase high-frequency spectrum. 
In the end, the total buildout cost should balance out; otherwise, there 
would be room for arbitrage. If anything, the FCC’s evidence of lower 
prices in the above-1000 MHz spectrum suggests that carriers that purchase 
such spectrum will not incur higher buildout costs, so long as buildout costs 
are properly defined to include both spectrum costs and deployment costs. 
C.   The Requisite Level of Spectrum Below-1000 MHz 
The FCC’s analysis of the concentration of spectrum holdings below 
1000 MHz is slightly misleading. Incremental sub-1000 MHz spectrum at 
any level does not always mean a significantly better product or improved 
performance. Indeed, a combination of above-1000 MHz spectrum and a 
small amount of below-1000 MHz spectrum can provide for effective 
performance. Ofcom, the FCC’s counterpart in Europe, explained this 
phenomenon in their rules for their forthcoming spectrum auction: 
[A] multi-frequency network combining 2x5MHz of 800MHz 
spectrum (operated at 15% loading) with 2x20 MHz of 2.6 GHz 
spectrum (operated at 85% loading) can on all measures, all but match, 
                                                                                                                 
 192. 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at para. 271 n.4. “‘MHz-POPs’ refers to the 
amount of spectrum in a given license or set of frequencies multiplied by the population 
covered by the geographic area of the spectrum license.” Id. 
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or even better, the performance of a network using 2x15 MHz of 800 
MHz spectrum alone (operated at 85% loading).193 
Indeed, the FCC itself acknowledges that a combination of high-
frequency and low-frequency spectrum can be valuable in offering 
competitive wireless service and that the mix of spectrum holdings is likely 
more important than absolute holdings.194  
Finally, in the 15th Wireless Report, the FCC explains that the Mobile 
Satellite Service (“MSS”) industry is “undergoing major technological and 
structural changes,” which will allow MSS providers to offer broadband 
services that “could potentially enhance competition in the provision of 
terrestrial mobile wireless services.”195 The report also notes that “the 
Commission is taking steps to make additional MSS spectrum available for 
new investment in mobile broadband networks . . . .”196 To the extent that 
MSS spectrum is fungible with spectrum in other frequency bands (like 
Cellular or 700 MHz) that support wireless broadband, it makes little sense 
to draw arbitrary lines around “good” spectrum as a way to determine a 
carrier’s market power. 
As we explain below in the section on policy, the best solution to any 
perceived competition problem is to get more spectrum into the market and 
to ensure that companies like Sprint Nextel, Leap, MetroPCS, Cellular 
South, and other new entrants that have not yet surfaced have access to that 
spectrum. Ofcom is seeking consultation for an upcoming auction (slated 
for 2012) in which it could package small amounts of lower frequency 
spectrum with larger amounts of higher frequency spectrum. If the FCC 
should deem below-1000 MHz spectrum to be uniquely advantageous, it 
can achieve the same goals by also packaging some below-1000 MHz 
spectrum with above-1000 MHz spectrum. But even this is likely 
                                                                                                                 
 193. OFCOM, CONSULTATION ON ASSESSMENT OF FUTURE MOBILE COMPETITION AND 
PROPOSALS FOR THE AWARD FOR 800 MHZ AND 2.6 GHZ SPECTRUM AND RELATED ISSUES: 
ANNEXES 7–13, 29 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 194. 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at para. 273 (“Some analysts also have 
observed that there can be important complementarities that come with holding spectrum 
assets in different frequency bands, noting that combination of sub-1 GHz and higher 
frequency spectrum may be optimal. For example, low frequency spectrum can be deployed 
ubiquitously with relatively few cell sites, providing a base layer of coverage that extends to 
wide areas in rural America as well as deep into buildings in urban areas. However, in urban 
areas where traffic concentration is high, this base coverage layer may be complemented 
with a capacity layer using high frequency spectrum. In this sense, higher-frequency 
spectrum is made more valuable by being combined with lower-frequency spectrum, and 
vice versa. Given these different spectrum characteristics, a licensee’s particular mix of 
spectrum holdings may affect its ability to provide efficient mobile wireless services.”).      
 195. 15th Wireless Report, supra note 4, at para. 39.       
 196. Id. at 9825 n.799.       
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unnecessary; in prior auctions, including the 700 MHz auction, significant 
amounts of below-1000 MHz spectrum were obtained by entrants.197  
VII. ARE WE MISSING SOMETHING? 
Economists recently have been criticized for fixating on price 
effects.198 Although consolidation might bring about lower prices through 
economies of scale and scope, the argument goes, innovation could be 
sacrificed if upstream inputs (in this case, handsets or applications) are 
foreclosed from rivals. While plausible as a matter of theory, the FCC has 
not offered any evidence that this risk is likely in the wireless industry. 
Indeed, the FCC’s report chronicles several developments that suggest that 
innovation among carriers and application providers (review below) is 
rapidly advancing.199  
Innovation at the core of the network does not appear to be stagnating. 
With the exception of T-Mobile, the national carriers are investing in LTE 
technology200 and deploying 4G services, which will offer peak data speeds 
at nearly ten times the speeds for 3G service. For example, LTE 
deployments are expanding rapidly, with Verizon Wireless covering thirty-
nine cities and MetroPCS covering thirty cities by the end of 2010. AT&T, 
Cellular South, and LightSquared each have planned LTE rollouts in 2011, 
and U.S. Cellular plans a rollout of LTE in 2012. In addition to LTE 
deployments, several carriers are introducing WiMax throughout the 
nation, including Clearwire (in major markets), Digital Bridge (small to 
medium markets), and Clearwire/Sprint (seventy-one markets). According 
to CTIA’s Semi-Annual Wireless Survey, the wireless carriers have 
                                                                                                                 
 197. Statement from Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, FCC, Statement (March 20, 2008), 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-280968A1.pdf (“A bidder other 
than a nationwide incumbent won a license in every market. As a result of the 700 MHz 
Auction, there is the potential for an additional wireless ‘third-pipe” [sic] in every market 
across the nation. Additionally, 99 bidders, other than the nationwide wireless incumbents, 
won 754 licenses – representing approximately 69 percent of the 1090 licenses sold in the 
700 MHz auction. The Auction therefore drew wide-ranging interest from a number of new 
players. For example, Frontier Wireless LLC (EchoStar), which is widely viewed as a new 
entrant, won 168 licenses in the E block to establish a near nationwide footprint for its 
services for consumers.”). 
 198. TIM WU, MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 165 
(2010) (criticizing Robert Crandall for focusing narrowly on the price effects of the 
Paramount decree).  
 199. 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at 11498 chart 8.  
 200. The 15th Wireless Report finds that five carriers had deployed or announced plans 
to deploy a LTE or WiMAX network by year-end 2010 or early 2011: Verizon Wireless, 
AT&T, Sprint, Clearwire and MetroPCS. 15th Wireless Report, supra note 4, at 9735 tbl. 
11. This does not include additional carriers with announced LTE plans, including Leap, 
U.S. Cellular, Cell South and LightSquared. With regard to T-Mobile, the report states “No 
U.S.-specific plans.” Id. 
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collectively invested nearly $300 billion in cumulative capital 
expenditure.201 
Innovation at the edges of the network, including handsets and 
applications, is also proceeding at a rapid pace. According to CTIA, 630 
devices are manufactured for the U.S. wireless market.202 Handset 
developments are described in greater detail in the policy section below. 
And innovation at the application layer suggests that wireless networks are 
not closed to independent content creators. Apple’s app store alone boasted 
500,000 applications for the iPhone as of January 2012.203 Although there 
are some notable cases in which Apple did not support an application that 
would displace the voice features of the iPhone (such as Google Voice), 
those choices were made by Apple and not by AT&T. Applications and 
smartphones (along with netbooks and other wireless-enabled Internet 
access devices) are complements; the more compelling the applications, the 
greater the demand for the devices to access the applications. No amount of 
consolidation in the wireless industry should alter that calculus. 
VIII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
Further regulation and intervention by the FCC in the wireless 
services industry could have significantly adverse effects on investment, 
competition, and consumers in the wireless industry. As demonstrated 
above, wireless services are in fact competitively supplied. Consumers are 
facing historically low prices for both wireless voice and data, and they 
have unparalleled options for handsets and service providers. Although 
there are numerous policy implications from the 14th and 15th Wireless 
Reports, we focus here on handset exclusivity and spectrum policy.  
A. Handset Exclusivity 
The 14th and 15th Wireless Reports open the door for limiting 
handset exclusivity arrangements. For example, the 14th Wireless Report 
characterizes exclusive handset contracts as a barrier to entry that “can 
create a kind of adjustment cost for potential entrants if lack of access to 
the exclusive technology delays the entry of potential entrants.”204 The 
15th Wireless Report uses nearly the same language.205 Empirically, the 
                                                                                                                 
 201. Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA (2011), http://files.ctia.org/pdf/ 
CTIA_Survey_MY_2011_Graphics.pdf.  
 202. 50 Wireless Quick Facts, CTIA ADVOCACY, http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/research/ 
index.cfm/AID/10378 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
 203. iPhone, APPLE, INC., http://www.apple.com/iphone/apps-for-iphone/ (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2012). 
 204. 14th Wireless Report, supra note 1, at para. 66. 
 205. 15th Wireless Report, supra note 4, at para. 65 (“Exclusive handset arrangements 
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FCC’s argument has no basis, as entry into the wireless eco-system has 
been robust. To date, the FCC has correctly refrained from interfering in 
these arrangements. 
Exclusivity agreements promote risk sharing in the launch of a new 
device, create incentives for marketing support for device manufacturers, 
and strengthen brand image through co-branding. They also compel 
manufacturers and carriers to innovate. For example, the iPhone’s 
exclusivity agreement with AT&T likely spurred the advent of Android-
powered phones on other carriers, such as Verizon,206 along with the Palm 
Pre and the BlackBerry Storm.207 Finally, exclusive agreements allow for 
more efficient financing terms. Because state-of-the-art handsets are 
expensive to make, it is difficult for manufacturers to finance customers’ 
purchases. The financing of a handset is essentially an unsecured loan with 
a depreciating and difficult to repossess asset. Carriers can provide more 
efficient finance terms by bundling service (along with a locked phone) 
with the handset. Under this arrangement, there is greater certainty that the 
loan will be repaid; the certainty is even greater when the arrangement is 
exclusive. 
Finally, exclusive handset agreements are commonly used in the 
wireless industry. A few notable examples include the Motorola Razr V3 
(exclusive through AT&T in 2004),208 the iPhone (exclusive through 
AT&T until 2011),209 the BlackBerry Storm (exclusive through 
Verizon),210 the Palm Pre (exclusive through Sprint until 2009),211 and the 
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first Google phone powered by Android (exclusive through T-Mobile).212 
When it launched its 4G services in 2011, MetroPCS promoted a 4G-
enabled Android smartphone by Samsung,213 the Galaxy Indulge that was 
not available through AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, or T-Mobile.214 That 
entrants such as MetroPCS use exclusive handset arrangements suggests 
they are motivated by efficiency reasons.  
B. Spectrum Policy 
By any measure, the wireless industry is approaching a spectrum 
capacity crisis. Accordingly, policymakers need to get more spectrum into 
the market and allow licensees the right to buy, sell, and trade spectrum as 
they see fit. As long as the FCC fails to inject major amounts of spectrum 
into the marketplace, or strongly hints that future spectrum could be off 
limits to carriers with specific spectrum portfolios (below 1000 MHz), the 
agency leaves companies facing capacity shortages in the near term with no 
solution other than secondary market purchases or to raise retail prices. If 
regulators are opposed to consolidation as a means of addressing the 
spectrum crunch, then the remedy is not to deny a licensee the right to sell 
or trade their spectrum as they see fit, but rather to release more spectrum. 
As suggested above, demand for wireless services has exploded. This 
increasing demand has unfortunately not been accompanied by increased 
spectrum access for providers. Up until this point, carriers have relied on 
core network innovation and increased efficiency to deal with increased 
traffic.215 The demand for spectrum, however, is only going to increase in 
the future as the consumer base for wireless services continues to grow and 
consumer preferences continue to trend toward smartphones.   
How pressing is the need for spectrum? Consider the following: in 
early 2009, Cisco forecasted wireless data annual growth rates of nearly 
140 percent, principally from the customer demand for handheld 
television.216 A June 2011 Cisco forecast placed the projected compound 
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annual growth rate for North America from 2010 to 2015 at 82 percent.217 
It bears noting that, like any forecast, the Cisco prediction could 
underestimate the amount of traffic that will be offloaded to Wi-Fi and 
other technologies, and it might not adequately consider the effects of more 
sophisticated rate plans that operators can use to shape traffic. The Cisco 
forecasts, along with more conservative forecasts by Coda and Yankee 
Group, are cited by the FCC.218  
Engineering experts estimate that without FCC action, spectrum 
demand will exceed supply within the next few years, which means that 
without action, consumers will face more dropped calls and more 
expensive and slower service.219 It is only a matter of time before the 
innovative spectral efficiency employed by carriers will no longer be 
sufficient to meet growing customer needs. Chairman Genachowski 
acknowledged in a recent speech that there is a serious spectrum crunch, 
but he claimed that there is no need for industry consolidation to solve it.220 
If that is the case, the FCC must execute the National Broadband Plan and 
release new spectrum imminently. Failure to do so could be catastrophic to 
the industry.  
Ironically, the very entry barriers in the wireless marketplace cited by 
the FCC are partially its own creation. The 14th Wireless Report admits 
that “spectrum policies affect the ability of potential entrants to access 
spectrum and hence the technological, economic, and legal resources 
required to expand capacity.”221 The FCC also points the finger at local and 
state governments for tower-siting delays, stating that “delays in zoning 
approvals can lengthen the process of cell site acquisition and deployment, 
thereby increasing costs for new or existing providers to enter into new 
markets.”222 Because spectrum and cell splitting (via additional towers) are 
substitutes, these entry barriers could be dissipated by more aggressive 
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spectrum allocation by the FCC (or more accommodating tower-siting 
policies by local governments). 
Further, the FCC bemoans that wireless entrants face large 
aggregation costs because of the high cost of regional spectrum licenses: 
For instance, in the two recent major spectrum auctions, the average 
spectrum price ranged from $0.53/MHz/Pop for the AWS-1 (Advanced 
Wireless Service) band (1700/2100 MHz band) in Auction 66 to 
$1.28/MHz/Pop for the 700 MHz band in Auction 73. At these prices, 
aggregating a significant regional spectrum footprint would involve an 
outlay of hundreds of millions of dollars and a national footprint would 
require billions of dollars.223   
The prices of these spectrum licenses are driven up because of the scarcity 
of the available spectrum. If spectrum were more readily available or even 
tradable by the parties, one would expect the prices of spectrum to 
decrease. Again the FCC is citing an example of a barrier to entry that it 
created. The 14th and 15th Wireless Reports also note that carriers have 
increasingly relied on mergers and acquisitions to mitigate spectrum 
shortages.224 Once again, this activity is driven by a lack of access to 
necessary resources.  
Skeptics might argue that releasing additional spectrum is difficult 
because there is simply not much spectrum left to be released. There is 
spectrum to be had, however, if the FCC reclaims spectrum that is unused, 
which would undo its poor allocation in the first place. For example, the 
following spectrum could be repurposed: (1) the broadcasters’ spectrum, 
(2) AWS-3 spectrum, (3) 400 MHz of spectrum identified by the World 
Radio Conference, and (4) 555 MHz of spectrum designated as unlicensed 
U-NII spectrum for use in wireless broadband.225 This spectrum could 
provide the necessary spectrum to at least temporarily meet the surging 
demand for wireless applications.  
Another potential solution would be to eliminate the spectrum 
allocation currently used by the FCC, which has resulted in spectrum 
misallocation and underutilization and, instead, treat spectrum as a more 
standard commodity (together with technical restrictions in spectrum 
licenses to protect against interference). In this scenario, spectrum would 
be like real estate: it could be bought, sold, leased, aggregated, or divided 
up as the market dictates. This solution is in line with the standard 
approach to a public good problem in economics known as the “Coase 
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Theorem.”226 This Coasian solution allows for spectrum to be put to its 
highest valued use, and it also allows for demand to be met in a more 
timely fashion as opposed to the bureaucracy-riddled method currently 
used by regulators.227 Although such a method is likely to have its share of 
detractors and political pitfalls, it is by far a more efficient solution to the 
spectrum crisis. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Our analysis suggests that the U.S. wireless services industry is 
effectively competitively supplied, just as the FCC concluded in its six 
prior competition reports through the 13th iteration. Although the industry 
did become more concentrated between the FCC’s 13th and 14th Wireless 
Reports, there is no economic rationale for changing a finding of effective 
competition based on that evidence alone. Indeed, there does not appear to 
be a clear statistical relationship between market structure and what 
customers pay in the wireless industry based on recent data. The absence of 
such a relationship is presumably due to the dynamic nature of the industry 
and the degree to which competition occurs along multiple dimensions, 
including handset and network quality. In drafting its next report, the FCC 
should bring its mode of analysis in line with modern economic thinking. 
Unless it can demonstrate a direct linkage between concentration and 
performance in today’s mobile wireless market, it should deemphasize the 
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Appendix 1: Wireless Plans Available in Washington, D.C. for 
Less Than $40 Per Month 
 PRICE POINT  
MINUTES $29.99 $35.00 $39.99 
Unlimited  Leap  
(Voice +Text) 
Sprint  
(After 18 months) 
Sprint 
(After 12 months) 




500   T-Mobile  
(Voice) 
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Appendix 2A: Alternative Regression Specifications 
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Appendix 2B: Alternative Regression Specifications 
Note: *** p<0.10, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

